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DAMAGES ASSESSED AGAINST INSURERS FOR WRONGFUL FAILURE TO PAY
INTRODUCTION

Protection of the individual insurance claimant from delay and oppression by the insurance company from which he seeks payment has
been the concern of courts and legislatures.' Where the insured brings
an action against his insurer for wrongful refusal to pay a just claim,2
the question arises as to how far the courts can proceed at common
law or under statute in the direction of awarding compensatory and
punitive damages for a breach of contract. On the one hand, the courts
seek to place the victim of the breach in that position he would have
occupied had the breach not occurred. Conversely, there is a recognition that beyond a certain point the ability of insurance companies
to determine which claims are due and payable may be unfairly
inhibited.3 Attacking the problem directly, several state legislatures enacted "penalty statutes" which allow punitive damages and reasonable
attorney's fees to be awarded in breach of contract actions where the
insurer is found to have acted in "bad faith." 4
THE CoMMoN LAw

Where penalty statutes do not apply, the common law rules of

New Orleans Ins. Assoc. v. Piaggio5 and Hadley v. Baxendale6 control.
Because these rules are strictly applied and have a tendency to allow
damages only within rather clearly defined limits7 they apparently
1. 48 HARV. L. REv. 319 (1934).

2. This problem is to be distinguished from those which arise out of duties other
than to pay the insured a money claim. See Lowe v. Turpie, 147 Ind. 652, 44 N.E. 25
(1896); Banewur v. Levenson, 171 Mass. 1, 50 N.E. 10 (1898); Pennsylvania Thresher-

men & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943).
3. 48 HARV. L. REv. 319 (1934).

4. Such statutes have been adopted in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.
5. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872).
6. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); See cases cited under 15 Am. JUR. Damages S 9
(1938).
7. First, in the ordinary situation only the amount stated in the policy plus legal
interest could be recovered. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378
(1872). Second, in extraordinary cases in which additional injury was sustained by the
plaintiff, consequential damages could be awarded if the damage could be shown to
[4661
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favor the insurer. Nevertheless, both rules are based on a common
law theory which manifests that damages for breach of contract should
be certain and clearly related to the rights and duties embodied in the
contract." Neither rule allows exemplary or "punitive" damages for
breach of contract.9
In recognizing the apparent need for certainty in the law, courts
have been reluctant to extend liability beyond the terms of the contract unless the damages asked are clearly the proximate result of the
breach.' 0 In actions on insurance contracts, where the obligation is to
pay money only, the rule of Piaggiois generally controlling, and plaintiff's recovery is limited to the amount due plus lawful interest." Where
the insurer is under a duty other than to pay money, the courts will
limit the measure of damages to those reasonably foreseeable as resulting from breach of the specific duty.' 2 Where liability is determined
by verdict of the court, as in "excess judgment" actions, there is no
,question as to the measure of damages.' 3 Damages felt to be "speculative" or "too remote" have been disallowed under the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale. 4 In this regard, there is usually a distinction drawn between a contract to pay money and a contract to lend money, because
in the latter instance there is more often a justification for the award
of consequential damages.' 3 Under either rule, the motivation of the
breaching party is irrelevant and6 wilfulness or malice alleged will not
aggravate the case for damages.'
have been such "as may fairly and reasonably be ,considered either arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such
as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at
the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854).
8. 5 S. WILLISTON oN CoNwrRcvs § 1410 (2d ed. 1936).
9. Smith v. Piper, 423 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Cc. App. 1967); White v. Benkowski, 37
Wis.2d 285, 155 N.W.2d 74 (1967); 5 A. Comaim, CoNrRAcrs § 1077 (1951).

10. Savings Bank v. Ashbury, 117 Cal. 96, 4g P. 1081 (1897); 15 Am. JuR. Damages166 (1938).
11. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 378, 386-387 (1872).
12. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 Md.
295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943); Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a Limitation on Dqmages for Breach of Contract,.
19 MiNe. L. REv. 497 (1934); RESrATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs 330 (1932).

13. Pike v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161 S.E.2d 453 (1968).
14. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
15. This distinction ordinarily occurs when there is a specific purpose for the loan.
understood by both parties at the time of contracting.A. ConuiN, Cow'rrAcrs § 1078
(1951).
16. Cheini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948).
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In the absence of statute, it appears that an insured who brings an
action against his insurer for wrongful refusal to pay a money claim
is not only faced with the disadvantage of what is normally a substantial disparity between his own legal and financial resources and
those of his corporate adversary,1 7 but also with the fact that his loss
will be measured in terms of a relatively narrow scope of damages.
Where recovery of the policy amount alone will not compensate him
for injuries which occurred as a result of his not receiving the money,
plaintiff must attempt to prove that such injuries are not remote or
speculative, but are the proximate result of insurer's delay or absolute
refusal to pay, or were within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of contracting.' 8 In view of these disadvantages, it is not
unusual that two facts often preclude litigation: (1) the claimant finds
that the cost of suit would exhaust any recovery he might have; and
(2) he is unable to sustain the burden of proof required to show
"proximate result" or "reasonable contemplation."
THE PENALTY STATUTES

The legislative response to this problem has been the "penalty" statute. ° Where penalty statutes have been enacted, courts have held
on the one extreme that the insurer is guilty of bad faith under the
statute if it litigates and loses.2 ' Other courts do not adhere to such
a strict view, rather holding that the fact of litigation is only evidence
of bad faith where no open question of fact or law is presented. 22 Nevertheless, at least one court in a "penalty" state has felt compelled to
speak out in defense of the insurer's right to litigate a disputed claim,
thus indicating an awareness that such statutes may operate unfairly
17. 48 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1934).

18. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); Taylor v. Colorado State Bank,
Colo. -, 440 P.2d 772 (1968); Pike v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161
S.E.2d 453 (1968).
19. Pike v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161 S.E.2d 453 (1968).
20. E.g.. TEx. Civ. STAT., INS. CODE §§ 3.62, 3.62-1 (1963). See also First Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Vittow, 323 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). The same result (with the
possibility of heavier damages) can be achieved in Texas at common law. Export Ins. Co.
v. Herrara, 426 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
21. Isaac Bell, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., 175 La. 599, 143 So. 705 (1932); First Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Vittow, 323 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
22. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Appleton, 296 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1961); Butler v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 233 Mo. App. 94, 93 S.W.2d 1019
(1936).

-
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and repressively against the insurance company.23 Under these statutes,
the insured is protected by a provision that the company must make
payment within a certain period of time, such as sixty days.24 Moreover, so the insured will not find the costs of suit prohibitive, the statutes generally provide for an award of reasonable attorney's fees.25
The total effect of the statutes seems varied. Although the immediate
result of a penalty statute is an increase in litigation, a decrease is soon
evidenced because the companies tend to settle disputed claims more
readily.26 Thus, claims practice must of necessity be well-regulated,
and companies must
be more careful in the handling of the policyholder
7
2
within the state.

In changing the common law rule to allow punitive damages for
breach of contract, the statutes have a dual effect. First, they increase
the company's risk of loss potential on a given policy and thereby
cause a more careful company evaluation of the claim in respect to
possible litigation. (As noted previously the tendency is to settle
claims more readily.) Second, the statute provides an upper limit to
the amount of damages which can be assessed as punitive, thereby
inhibiting possible jury prejudice against corporations.2 But in spite
of the fact that the penalty legislation has the extremely desirable feature of limiting punitive damages, the insurance industry has resisted
the passage of such statutes whenever possible,"9 apparently on the
theory that the common law is more favorable to the insurer.30
SoME DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CoMMoN LAW

While it may have been true in the past that the common law
favored the insurer, there are indications that this may no longer be
the case. Judicial handling of the problem has centered on the nature
of the action, with the chief difficulty being the rigidity of the gov23. Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 233 Mo. App. 94, 93
S.W.2d 1019 (1936).
24. E.g., TEx. Civ. STAT., INS. CODE § 3.62-1 (1963).
25. E.g., Tx. Civ. STAT., INS. CODE § 3.62 (1963).

26. Smith, Penalties, Attorney's Fees and Punitive Damages as a Factor in Certain
Claims Litigation (October, 1963) (Unpublished article by R.W. Smith, Vice President
and Counsel, Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, Portland, Maine.)
27. ld.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. But see Export Ins. Co. v. Herrara, 426 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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erning rules.," These rules are particularly vexing where plaintiff's
grievance has all the necessary elements of two different valid causes
of action, only one of which may come before the court. Thus, the
strict application of those rules in combination with the restrictive
effect of the common law forms of action has in many cases inhibited
plaintiff's attempts to recover while insulating the insurer from greater
liability 2 However, the ability to join causes of action in tort and
contract where they arise out of the same transaction under the codes
or under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 has made it possible
for a plaintiff, under a favorable fact situation, to plead essentially the
same facts in a cause of action in contract and a cause of action in
tort.35 As the plaintiff may allege both causes and may recover in both,
the full range of damage is open to him-actual damage in the amount
of the policy, consequential damages for the breach, where such can
be proved, and punitive damages for the tort (usually fraud), where
alleged and proved.3 6
Indications of how the law in this area may develop arise from an
examination of the South Carolina "doctrine" of fraudulent breach of
contract" coupled with a recognition of recent developments in the
law of California.
31. Tight adherence to the measure of damages of New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v.
Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872), and Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. 1854), combined with the restrictive and channelling effect of the forms of action
and rules of common law pleading (particularly the doctrine of election) to make a
breach of contract action which was accompanied with fraudulent overtones strictly a
contract action. Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922). This would
then limit damages to "actual" and in unusual cases "consequential." As time went on,
however, courts have recognized that in certain cases contract and tort ought not to
be separated because although they arise out of the same facts, different rights and
duties are sought to be protected in each. E.g., Felder v. Great Am. Ins. Co.; 260
F. Supp. 575 (C.D. S.C. 1966).
32. Colvin v. McCormick Cotton Oil Co., 66 S.C. 61, 44 S.E. 380 (1903); Carpenter
v. Moore, 51 Wash.2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958); see cases cited under 1 AM. JUt.
Actions § 50 (1936); 1 C.J.S. Actions § 44 (1936). Compare Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio
St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1932) with Meeker v. Shafranek, 112 Ohio App. 320, 176 N.E.2d
293 (1960).
33. Compare Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal.App.2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941) with
Export Ins. Co. v. Herrara, 426 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 7-12.
35. Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal.App.2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941); Export Ins. Co. v.
Herrara, 426 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
36. Export Ins. Co. v. Herrara, 426 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
37. Felder v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (C.D. S.C. 1966); Blackmon
v. United Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 424, 105 S.E.2d 521 (1958); Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C.
108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904).
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DocTRINE oF "FRAUDULENT BREAcH":

SOUTH CARoLINA

some,3

the doctrine of frauduAlthough considered an anomaly by
lent breach of contract remains the law of South Carolina. This theory
does not diverge from the general rule in states allowing joinder and
in the federal courts which allows recovery in one action under one
fact situation for breach of contract and for tort, where the tort
arises out of a duty imposed by law brought on by the contract relation.39 Analysis of the early decisions upon which the doctrine is
based does not support the contention that punitive damages have
ever been awarded in that state purely for breach of contract.40 In the
often cited case of Rose and Rogers v. John S. Beatie,41 in which the
"fraudulent breach" theory originated, it is apparent that the court
was struggling to overcome the restrictions of the common law forms
of action as it was faced with an overriding political and commercial

42
necessity to find liability and fully compensate the injured parties.
Even in the face of such compulsion,43 the court did not go beyond
awarding a measure of damages well within the scope of Hadley v.
Baxendale.44 The rationale was that the parties should be placed in
that position which they would have occupied had there been no
breach.45 Although the court mentioned punitive damages, none were
awarded.4
However, in Welborn v. Dixon,47 a majority of the court felt that
Rose had in fact established the precedent that punitive damages could
be awarded in a breach of contract action where the breach was accompanied by fraud.48 But the dissent on that issue is compelling, and
38. Smith, supra note 26.
39. Felder v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (C.D. S.C. 1966).
40. Punitive damages are not awarded in absence of fraud alleged and proved. Givens
v. North Augusta Elec. & Improvement Co., 91 S.C. 417, 74 S.E. 1067 (1912).
41. Compare Rose v. Beatie, 2 Nott & MeCord 538, 5 S.C. 216 (1820) 'with Welborn
v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904) and Export Ins. Co. v. Herrara, 426 S.W.2d
895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); see Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, - Cal.2d -,
428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
42. Rose v. Beatie, 2 Nott & McCord 538, 541-542, 5 S.C. 216, 217 (1820).
43. Id.
44. id. at 543, 5 S.C. at 218.
45. "Upon the principle of reciprocity, as well as good faith, the parties ought to
be placed upon the same footing they would have been if there had been no deception;
and that is the effect of this verdict." Id. at 544, 5 S.C. at 218.
46. The damages were tied to the contract as the difference in the two sale prices in
which the buyer sustained the loss.
47. 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904).
48. Id.
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it is apparent that the court intended to award consequential damages.4 9
As both Rose and Welborn were deeply involved with the problems
of form, the difficulties with which they were most concerned would
not arise under modern liberal rules of pleading. The ultimate import
of these cases lies in their establishing the basic authority for the
"fraudulent breach doctrine." 50
Later cases, while not without technical pleading problems, clearly
indicate that the action is both tort and contract, and even though the
pleading may be arranged physically within one paragraph, that paragraph must allege all the elements of a breach of contract and of the
tort of fraud. " ' Thus it would seem that regardless of form, two causes
of action must be alleged and proved. 2
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the cases decided under the
South Carolina rule regarding insurance contract actions is the sensitivity of the South Carolina court to misconduct on the part of the
insurance companis. 5 3 There is apparently a tendency to regard any
misconduct which causes harm as a "fraudulent act." " Moreover, it
would appear that it is this sensitivity to misconduct which in reality
applies the greatest pressure on the insurance company doing business
in South Carolina to conduct its affairs properly. 55
EXPANSION OF

THE HADLEY RULE:

CALIFORNIA

If the distinguishing feature of the South Carolina "doctrine" is
its sensitivity to misconduct on the part of the insurer, the recent Cali-

fornia decision of Reicbertv. General Insurance Company of America56
indicates that, in California at least, a reinterpretation of the common
law has widened the scope of liability heretofore restricted by the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, as codified in California Civil Code, see49. Id. at 110, 49 S.E. at 235-238.
50. Annot. 84 ALR 1345, 1351-52 (1933).

51. Felder v. Great Am. Ins. Co, 260 F. Supp. 575 (C.D. S.C. 1966); Traco Steel, Inc.
v. Mitchell, 39 F.R.D. 320 (A.D. S.C. 1966); Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E.
232 (1904).
52. Felder v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (C.D. S.C. 1966); see Export Ins.

Co. v. Herrara, 426 S.W2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal.2d
674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941).
53. Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316 (1964).

54. Id.; Dawkins v. National Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800 (C.D. C.C. 1966).
55. Smith, supra note 26.

56. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 53 Cal. Rptr. 693 (5th Dist. Ct. App.
1966), rehearinggranted 59 Cal. Rptr. 724, 428 P.2d 860 (1967).
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tion 3300." In Reichert, defendant issued a fire insurance policy covering a portion of the risk of plaintiff's motel. 8 The motel was partially
destroyed by fire and insured claimed the benefits under the policy,
which the company refused to pay." Plaintiff was forced into bank-

ruptcy and the motel passed into the hands of a receiver. 60 On appeal,
the district court of appeals6 - held that plaintiff had no standing to
sue and then discussed the issue of damages in terms of the well-established common law view.62
The case reached the Supreme Court of Californias where the issue of damages was again twofold: (1) plaintiff claimed actual damages under the policy and, in addition, damages for his entire loss as a
result of the bankruptcy;"4 and (2) punitive damages were claimed for
defendant's willful refusal to pay.65 The court, while agreeing that

plaintiff should recover his actual loss of the policy amount plus the
loss attributable to the bankruptcy, 66 would not allow punitive damages under California Civil Code, section 3294, because the action
67
sounded in contract.
57. Compare Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854) with CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3300 (1957). See Baumgarten v. Alliance Assur. Co., 159 F. 275 (N.D. Cal. 1908).
58. Of the total premiums paid on four policies ($31,730.55) defendant received
$7,859.25. Of the total risk ($1,375,000.00) defendant's contract liability to plaintiff was
$375,000.00. Plaintiff claimed that his actual loss was $1,500,000, or the value of the
property he lost as a result of the bankruptcy. The trial court sustained defendant's
demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend. The district court affirmed following the interpretation of the California Civil Code in Baumgarten v. Alliance Assurance Co., 159 F. 275 (N.D. Cal. 1908) and New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggio, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 378 (1872).
59. Although the breach was allegedly done "maliciously and oppressively," the
action was held to be one of contract for which exemplary damages could not be
awarded. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 53 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1966). The Supreme Court of California agreed with this position. Reichert v.
Cal.2d -, 428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724, 733 (1967).
General Ins. Co. of America, 60. The plaintiff alleged as a motive for the breach the desire of defendant to cause
the bankruptcy. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 53 Cal. Rptr. 693, 694 (5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
61. Id. at 701.
62. Id. See also Loudon v. Taxing Dist, 104 U.S. 771 (1881); New Orleans Ins.
Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872). CAL. CIV. CODE § 3302 (1957). See cases
cited under 15 Am. Jum. Damages 153 (1938).
Cal.2d -,
428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal.
63. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, Rptr. 724 (1967).
64. The aggregate amount was again $1,500,000 referred to as "actual" damages.
65. The amount asked was $5,000,000.
Cal.2d -, 428 P.2d 860, 864-867, 59
66. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, Cal. Rptr. 724, 728-731 (1967).
67. Id., 428 P.2d at 869, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 733. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (1957) is

474,
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In rejecting the narrow rule of New OrleansIns. Assoc. v. Piaggio6 8
on the dual rationale that an insurer's liability is not limited to the
amount stated in the policy 9 and that the California Civil Code, section 3302, is not an exclusive measure of damages, 70 the court paved
the way for a more liberal interpretation of section 33 00.71

In awarding consequential damages, the court rejected common law
theory, 7" holding that an "insurance company is chargeable with the
knowledge of why people have fire insurance and of the likelihood that
improper delay in payment may result in the very injuries for which
the insured sought protection by purchasing the policies." " The court
reasoned that damages for breach of a fire insurance contract are "all the
detriment... flowing from the breach which the breaching party contemplated or should have contemplated

. . .

as likely to result from his

failure to perform." 7' Thus it appears that a much broader scope of
liability has emerged. The question of the contemplation of the parties
would never have been reached if the court had followed the Baumgarten v. Alliance Assur. Co. 7 5 interpretation of California Civil Code,

section 3302. It is also extremely doubtful under the traditional ap7 that bankruptcy of the
plication of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale
as follows:

Exemplary Damages, When Allowable. In an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition
to actual damages, may recover exemplary damages for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant.
See Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Haigler v. Donnelly, 18
Cal.2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941).

68. Cf. note 7 supra.
69. The court stated that:
It is true that Baumgarten v. Alliance Ins. Co., C.C., [sic] 159 F[ed.] 275,
277, held that section 3302 prevents an insurance company from being liable
for more than the face value of the policy, plus interest from the time the
insurer should have paid the claim. Baumgarten's interpretation of section
3302 is simply incorrect.
Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, -- Cal.2d -,
428 P.2d 860, 867,
59 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731 (1967).
70. The court held that the fact that full compensation could be rendered by payment of amount due plus legal interest is a rebuttable presumption.
71. See CAL. Civ. CoDE S 3300 (West 1957).
72. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, -- Cal.2d -,
428 P.2d 860, 866, 59
Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (1967).
73. Id., 428 P.2d at 864, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
74. Id., 428 P.2d at 865, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (emphasis added).
75. 159 F. 275 (N.D. Cal. 1908).
76. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854).
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insured would be considered to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. A comparison between Reichert and Rose v.
John S. Beatie77 leads to the conclusion that in each, regardless of traditional theory, the court's object was to provide full compensation for
the injured party.
PROTECTION REQUIRED FOR INSURER AND INSURED

Whether the correction of the abuse of an insured by an insurer be
undertaken legislatively or judicially, the need for a balance between
the interests of insurance companies, the individual, and society must
be recognized. The improper and extravagant assessment of damages
against a company will not only tend to force the companies to compensate through an increase in rates, but may in a given case impair the
rights of other policyholders. It has become a truism that insurance
provides a substantial basis for individual and group economic stability.
That the policyholders of insurance companies look to the company,
not only for protection from disaster, but also for stability in investment
and certainty in estate planning, makes the insurer in some degree a
protector of social order and general economic stability. Any action
against an insurance company must be viewed in the light of its ultimate effect on society. It is in the interest of society that insurers be
solvent, and that the insurer be able to compensate for risks undertaken
when called upon to do so. It also seems essential that the insurer be
able to calculate the risk that he will underwrite, and contract to protect for specifically stated risks based upon those calculations. The
law of contract, which has generally supported this aspect of the insurance business, ought not now to be changed so drastically as to create instability and uncertainty in the ordinary business of an industry
upon which so much of modern society depends for compensation in
time of personal disaster or incapacity.
CONCLUSION

While the effect of some excess liability may be to force insurers to
handle claims properly, it is no less likely that awards of unreasonably
heavy damages in excess of policy limits may tend to encourage speculative claims, making the companies greater prey to fraud than they
now are. Additionally, in view of the well-recognized popular prejudice
against insurance companies, some protection must be afforded by
77. Rose v. Beate, 2 Nott

& McCord 538, 544, 5 S.C. 216, 218 (1820).
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courts and legislatures. In particular, the courts should neither allow
nor encourage unreasonable damages for the wrongful conduct of an
insurer, but should act within the general framework of awarding such
damages as will place the palintiff in the position he would have occupied had there been no breach.s In a given case this may mean
that the insured will be allowed damages in excess of the benefits allowable under the policy where the insurer has been guilty of actionable misconduct toward the insured. It may also ordinarily mean
that costs and reasonable attorney's fees will be awarded plaintiff where
the insurer is in fact guilty of misconduct. But in awarding damages
beyond these limits, courts should proceed with reluctance and with
the knowledge that excessive damages may not serve the public good.
Punishment of the company should be left to the regulatory bodies
set up for that purpose.79
TERRY

78. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America,
Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (1967).
79. Smith, supra note 26.
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428 P.2d 860, 866, 59

